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Las derechas en América latina en el siglo XX: problemas, desafíos y perspectivas – Coord. Ernesto Bohoslavsky y Stéphane Boisard

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# Afterword for Pensar las derechas en América Latina en el siglo XX

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**Notes de la rédaction**

Editor's note: After that Margaret Power sent us her Afterwords, some editorial changes have undergone in the edition process. So, the papers that Jonathan Brown, Mila Burns, Aaron Bell and Marcos Fernández Labbé have discussed in the Conference finally are not part of this volume. The paper Thomas Rath has originally presented in the conference ("The Right Wing of the Mexican Revolutionary Family? The Case of General Bonifacio Salinas Leal, 1930s-1970s") and Margaret Power has commented here, is a previous version of the one that can be found in this website. Finally, Rodrigo Nabuco sent his chapter too late to be included in this Afterwords.

**Notes de l'auteur**

I thank Andrae Marek, Teresa Prados-Pereira, Michael Staudenmeir, Ellen Walsh, and Neici Zeller for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Afterword.

## *Texte intégral*

1 When I finished reading this book my first thoughts were, what an outstanding

group of studies on the Rights in Latin America! And the second was how pleased I am that Ernesto Bohoslavsky and Stéphane Boisard, the editors, asked me to write the Afterword.[1]

2 This collection of essays significantly increases our understanding of different expressions of the Right in Latin America, as well as of Latin American politics and history in general across the region and the twentieth century. The essays in the book accomplish various goals. Some offer new insights into the important political role previously ignored right-wing movements, individuals, organizations, and parties in Latin America played and the extent of influence they exerted. Others present fresh interpretations of the Latin American Rights, such as how important transnational connections were to their formation and spread or that the Rights are not necessarily monolithic, traditionalist, anti-modern or elitist. They all stimulate the reader to learn more about the Rights in Latin America, even as they suggest new directions for future research.

3 Each chapter combines careful empirical research, scholarly analysis, and insightful interpretations regarding what constitutes the Rights in Latin America. The book closely considers and greatly enriches our understanding of the political and historical context in which various expressions of the Right developed. It also illustrates the dynamic interplay that existed between the Right and the Left in Latin America and the extent to which the Right responded to and, in many cases, attempted to counter the threat it perceived the Left presented to its worldview and political power.

Mujeres golpeando las cacerolas. Santiago de Chile, 1971. Centro de Documentación de *El Mercurio*. Publicado en Power, Margaret, *La mujer de derecha. El poder femenino y la lucha contra Salvador Allende, 1964-1973*, DIBAM, Santiago, 2008, p. 173

4 One point that emerges from many chapters is that the Latin American Rights were not a stagnant force, stuck in a past that they clung to in vain, hoping to forestall any change that would undermine their values and power. Instead, the chapters present various and vivid portraits of the Rights that were continually evolving and adapting to the new conditions and challenges they confronted. These chapters and the study of the Rights in general offer the reader an invaluable and generally underexplored perspective from which to examine broader Latin American history and politics.

5 I have organized the Afterword into two sections. The first and longer section contains a critical discussion of several themes that emerged from my reading of the essays: transnationalism; Catholicism; the United States; class; ideology; violence; and education and schools. In the second, much briefer, section I point out several areas that the studies overlook and suggest that they would be fruitful topics for future research.

# Section One

## Transnationalism

6 A common misperception about the Right is that it was a predominantly, indeed in many cases an exclusively nationalist project.[2] The case studies offered in this book effectively dispel that myth. Although the various Rights under discussion were most certainly rooted in their own national realities, many of them also considered themselves part of a larger hemispheric, and in some cases global, context, as a number of the chapters show. Because many right-wing organizations believed they were confronting an enemy that transcended their national borders, they consciously sought out like-minded organizations that operated beyond their nation.

7 The attitude and actions of the post-1964 military government in Brazil that are the subject of Mila Burns' chapter illustrate the transnational reach of the Latin American Rights. Burns draws on documents the Brazilian government released in 2012 to discuss how and why the Brazilian military dictatorship encouraged and supported the overthrow of the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.[3] Following the military's ouster of João Goulart in 1964, Brazil functioned as a counterrevolutionary bastion in the Southern Cone. The anti-communist Brazilian armed forces regarded the 1970 election of Allende, a Socialist, with disfavor. Specific events exacerbated the Brazilian government's antagonism to his presidency. For example, Brazilian leftists who opposed their nation's military dictatorship found refuge in Chile following Allende's election. This concrete demonstration of the transnational bonds that existed among the South American Left antagonized the Brazilian military and increased its hostility to the Allende government. In addition, the Brazilian media, which the military largely controlled, routinely criticized the Allende government and predicted it would soon terminate democracy in Chile. This coverage must have angered the Chilean government, but it offered an ideological justification to the Brazilian government in its efforts to overthrow Allende. Further, the Allende government threatened to disrupt the positive relations that existed between the Chilean Right and armed forces and their Brazilian counterparts, a step that would undermine Brazilian power in the region. In order to counter this possibility and promote its repressive vision of stability and order, the Brazilian military and conservative forces furthered the ouster of Allende and the Popular Unity government.

8 The Brazilian armed forces were not the only Southern Cone military to involve themselves in the politics of their neighbors. As part of his larger discussion on violence and the state in Argentina between 1973 and 1975, Juan Luis Besoky points out that the military high commands of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay met in 1971, four years before the formation of Plan Condor, to develop a regional network to work together to defeat the guerrilla movements in these four nations.[4] It

is telling that the commanders of these conservative armed forces understood the importance of transcending the nation as part of their campaign to extirpate a population they considered innately dangerous, in their words, "intrínsecamente perversa." The fact that they did so also suggests that, while each national military was committed to fighting what it defined as the internal enemy, it was also quite willing to join with its comrades-in-arms to seek out and destroy the "external enemy" as well.

9 The willingness of the Southern Cone militaries to work together to ensure the defeat of those it considered a threat was hardly unique; nor was their vision of who their friends and enemies were. As Aaron Bell shows, right-wing forces in El Salvador also sought out other anti-communist forces across the region. Salvadoran rightist Mario Sandoval Alarcón rose to prominence in the *Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana*, the Latin American branch of the World Anti-Communist League. And Roberto D'Abuisson headed ARENA, the violent, extreme rightist party in El Salvador, in the 1980s. In response to President Jimmy Carter's diplomatic emphasis on human rights, which resulted in the administration criticizing ARENA's tactics and subsequently curtailing funds to it, D'Abuisson visited Southern Cone dictatorships seeking their support and material assistance.

10 Ernesto Bohoslavsky's chapter also employs a transnational lens to discuss how liberal forces in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay drew on their anti-fascist credentials and politics to criticize, more or less openly, Peronismo in Argentina as well as the presidency of Getulio Vargas in Brazil and the leadership of Luis Alberto de Herrera of the Partido Blanco in Uruguay from 1943 to 1955. Using the Southern Cone nations as his frame, Bohoslavsky explores how liberal sectors in each nation simultaneously "circulated, appropriated, and adopted" ideas to disparage Peronismo in Argentina and vilify their own leaders. To do so, they drew on anti-fascist networks they had developed during World War Two and seamlessly refigured them to advance their anti-dictatorial agenda following the end of the war. Although Bohoslavsky clearly shows the connections among these Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan forces, he does not explain why he considers these liberal networks to be right-wing. They apparently allied themselves with the United States and, presumably, with capitalism. Is that why Bohoslavsky defines them as the Right? A clearer statement on these people's political ideology would help to clarify where they placed themselves on the political spectrum and how we should interpret their politics. Despite my confusion as to how to situate these people politically, this chapter offers a very lucid description of how liberal forces in three Southern Cone countries worked together to further each other's and their own political goals by presenting themselves as anti-fascist, anti-authoritarian, and pro-democracy.

11 Because the Latin American Rights defined the enemy as global communism, they developed contacts with like-minded forces around the world. Maud Chirio's chapter explores the Rights' transnational connections beyond Latin American by examining European and U.S. military influences on the Brazilian military. After noting that this influence began as early as the late nineteenth century, her chapter focuses on the publication of translations of French and U.S. military articles in Brazilian military journals. She concludes that many of these articles emphasized the concept of the "internal enemy" and thereby contributed to the Brazilian military's willingness to define their own population as key targets of repression. What Chirio fails to point out is that although the articles reflect French and U.S. ideological influences, the Brazilian military chose which articles to translate and publish. Their choice likely mirrored the interests and needs of the armed forces and, in all probability, indicates what mattered to them and what political perspective they sought to impart to their

readers.

12 Transnationalism beyond Latin America is also the topic of Gilberto Grassi Calil's chapter on Brazilian Plínio Salgado. Salgado was exiled to Portugal in 1939 after an unsuccessful coup attempt against Brazilian president Getulio Vargas. While there, he drew on conservative Catholic networks and established contacts with right-wing Catholic leaders, who shared and promoted his conservative views on the Church and politics and sympathized with fascism, as did he. Salgado used the prominent position he was accorded in Portuguese society to preach his pro-fascist politics disguised as Christian theology. After Brazil entered World War Two on the side of the allies and following the 1945 defeat of fascism, Salgado attempted to recast himself as a supporter of democracy, a Christian democracy, but not a member of the centrist Christian Democratic Party.

13 As these examples show, the Latin American Rights defined themselves as nationalist projects, but they operated in a transnational context and manner. They built alliances with their political counterparts throughout the continent and Europe, secured and gave resources from and to each other, shaped each other's ideological and theological thinking and beliefs, and brashly ignored national borders to help overthrow governments they deemed a danger.

## Catholicism

14 Since the late 1400s the Catholic Church has been the most significant transnational institution in Latin America. It arrived with the conquistadores and subsequently aligned itself with the colonial elite that ruled Latin America until the early 1800s or, in the cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the 1890s. For most of its history, it was part of that elite, offering theological, moral, and ideological justification for the perpetuation of the economic, social, and political system that guaranteed its position – and that of the rest of the upper classes – and wealth.

15 Nonetheless, the Catholic Church was never solely a monolithic, conservative entity. The history of the Catholic Church in Latin America reveals numerous individuals and movements that have offered different interpretations of Catholicism and its relationships to the various social classes. The examples of Bernardino Sahagún's defense of Mexico's indigenous population during the colonial period, Fathers Miguel Hidalgo and José María Morelos' support for the peasants as part of Mexico's struggle for independence in the early 1800s, and the continental-wide embrace of Liberation Theology in the 1960s and beyond all attest to the existence of multiple strains of thought and practice within the Church. Nonetheless, for much of its history the Catholic Church, and most especially those in the upper echelons of its hierarchy, allied with and drew leaders from the elite.

16 Given this reality, it comes as no surprise that so many chapters in a book on the Rights in Latin America focus on the Catholic Church. What is somewhat surprising is that none of the chapters mentions Protestantism or the inroads that the various conservative Protestant churches have made in Latin America.[5] The chapters discuss Catholicism as if it were the only religion that advanced a right-wing agenda in Latin America, while clearly this was not nor is the case.

17 However, what several of the chapters do make very clear is the extent to which the Catholic Church played a prominent role in Latin American right-wing politics. As Martín Castro's study of the Argentine Catholic Church following the adoption of the 1912 electoral law shows, the Catholic Church is neither a monolithic body nor an opponent of modernity. Instead, as his chapter explains, the Argentine Catholic

Church responded in a variety of ways to the expansion of the electorate and the widening of democracy. Far from rejecting or ignoring it, sectors of the Argentine Catholic Church sought to make the best use of it. To paraphrase a common colloquialism, they figured if you can't beat it (the new law), then join it (the new political situation). And that is exactly what they did! They worked with the ruling coalition, joined or formed political parties and, true to their class interests, encouraged the wealthy to get active in politics and did what they could to prevent the rise of socialism. The Argentine Catholic hierarchy chose to accommodate itself to the new situation in order to ensure its dominant position in the new social and political configuration then emerging in the country.

18 Differences within the Catholic Church continued throughout the twentieth century, only to intensify following the radical new challenges to the religious, theological, economic, political, and social status quo that Liberation Theology presented beginning in the 1960s, a subject that Marcos Fernández Labbé explores in his chapter on the church in Chile. Opposition to the tenets and practices of conservative Catholic forces and the political Right ran so deeply in Chile that the recently-formed Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won the 1964 presidential elections. The PDC represented the new face of Catholicism in Chile, one adapted to the modern world, firmly rooted in the Catholic faith, and opposed to both conservatism and Marxism. Conservative Catholic forces regrouped and launched a counter-attack against the PDC and more leftist Catholic sectors, such as Christians for Socialism and the various Catholic parties that formed part of the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende. Rejecting calls for the structural changes that they associated with Marxism, right-wing Catholic forces urged the return to traditional, conservative interpretations of Christianity, the role of the Church and its members, and respect for established hierarchies. Instead of social programs and an activist church, they advocated charity and good works, conducted through the benevolent wing of the Church, not under the auspices of the state. In most respects, they got what they wanted in the military dictatorship of General Pinochet.

19 In a similar vein, Rodrigo Coppe Caldeira analyzes how right-wing Catholic leaders in Brazil defied and combated the challenges to traditionalism that Vatican II presented. Far from adapting to them, let alone accepting them, they worked fervently to oppose them. Coppe Caldeira explores two prominent figures, Geraldo de Proença Sigaud, the bishop of Jacarezinho in Paraná, and Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira, who founded Tradition, Family, and Property in 1960.[6] These two men illustrate the virulence and intransigence with which they and other influential members of the Catholic hierarchy rejected the tenets of Liberation Theology and the connections that existed among them. Both men, along with many other right-wing Catholics, associated the progressive changes that Liberation Theology introduced with communism. They further attributed what they considered to be erroneous interpretations of the meaning of Catholicism to the machinations of International Judaism, which they believed was the diabolical force responsible for the attempts to alter that which they considered unchangeable: the "liturgy encoded by tradition, the immutable transmission of revelation, the veracity of the Scriptures, the Church's hierarchical structure, [and] the primacy of Catholicism over other religious traditions." On this basis, they joined forces to attempt to defeat the new tenets of the faith by directly confronting them in Rome.

20 The Catholic Church considered schools and education central to its mission and key sites from which to confront those it designated the enemy: secularists and communists. To illustrate this, Romain Robinet discusses two generations of anti-Communist Catholic student organizations in Mexico. The first generation founded

El Congreso Local de Estudiantes del Distrito Federal (CLEDF) in 1916 and subsequently contributed to the formation of the Partido Nacional Cooperatista. Influenced by the depredations of the Mexican Revolution and the vision of the 1917 Constitution, it represented a more moderate Right, one that supported a degree of social reform. The second generation, which created the *Union Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos* in 1931 was radicalized by the violence of the Cristero revolt. The first generation, which Robinet defines as center-right, advocated a third way that was neither capitalist nor communist. Instead, it proposed a society based on voluntary and moral solidarity and a Cooperative Republic, in opposition to both class struggle and the extremes of capitalism. Both generations opposed Article Three of the Constitution because it secularized education in Mexico. They also considered themselves revolutionaries who wanted to unite all of Latin America based on the region's shared tradition of *Hispanismo*, the intertwining of Spanish and Catholic identity

21 Mario V. Santiago Jiménez covers similar territory in his study of the formation, thinking, and activity of El Yunque, a secret group of Mexican university students that began in 1953. In order to explain Catholics' fear and their perception that secularism dominated the university, Santiago Jiménez traces the history of anti-clericalism in Mexico, as crystallized in the 1917 Constitution that legalized and normalized secular control of education and the Mexican state's attacks against the Catholic Church. The persecution that many Mexican Catholics experienced following the Mexican Revolution and their dread of ongoing attacks led many of the faithful to identify strongly with Spanish Catholics in the 1930s who, they believed, were the victims of Spanish Republicans. For this reason, as both Santiago Jiménez and Robinet point out, right-wing Catholic organizations endorsed the Spanish Falange, supported General Franco, and opposed the Republic.

## Education and Schools

22 However, Catholics were not the only conservative forces to organize among students and young people; the Right in general did, as Gabriel Bucheli's discussion of the Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (JUP) illustrates. The JUP emerged in 1970, during a period of heightened conflict and polarization between the Left and the Right in Uruguay. The right-wing organization was instrumental in defending and promoting the Right's political agenda among students; it also became the "most visible right-wing social movement" of the time. One of the key questions Bucheli asks is what responsibility did the JUP have in the violence that occurred in Uruguay prior to the 1973 coup. His chapter explores the relationship between nonstate actors, in this case mainly right-wing youth, and the state's use of violence against the civilian population. Specifically, Bucheli attempts to penetrate the layers of myth and silence that shroud JUP's role in the murder of left-wing youth in Montevideo during student clashes in the early 1970s. Although Bucheli determines there is no clear-cut answer to the question regarding JUP's links to the murders, he concludes that while it is unlikely members of the JUP carried out the killings themselves, they certainly called on the armed forces to intervene in Uruguayan politics, thus supporting the imposition of military rule and sanctioning state violence at an unprecedented level.

23 Argentine, Chilean, and other Latin American extreme rightists believed that professors espousing a Marxist, secular ideology had taken over the continent's universities, as Laura Graciela Rodríguez explores in her chapter. This was of particular concern to them because it was precisely those institutions that educated

their nations' elite, the future rulers of the country. Reflecting the transnational connections that existed among them, members of various right-wing Latin American organizations and individuals formed the *Consejo Hispanoamericano de Estudiantes* in 1975, which wrote and disseminated its perspective on the state of higher education in the region. This document contained a frontal attack on science, which it stated "deviated from the Natural, Christian Order" and was the product of a conspiratorial web of sinister forces, including the Ford Foundation and UNESCO, all of which were, inevitably, under the sway of Marxist-Leninist ideas. Science and scientific methods therefore should be opposed, and Catholic universities, where *Hispanismo*, Catholic values, respect for hierarchy, and the silencing of students' voices prevailed, upheld.

## The United States

24 As the preceding section notes, many of the chapters examine the relationship between the Right and the Catholic Church. However, only five chapters (Aaron Bell, Mila Burns, Jonathan Brown, Maud Chirio, and Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta) address the relationship between the Right and the United States. What does this mean? Perhaps it reflects the historiographical shift that has occurred in our approach to understanding North-South relations and the internal dynamics of individual nations. Instead of assuming the United States is forever and always the key actor in the Americas, the lynch pin that initiates and keeps all the wheels turning, for the last several decades scholars have studied what local actors have done to shape their nation's history. No longer mere puppets of the omnipotent United States, local, non-U.S. actors have increasingly emerged as key protagonists in their nations and across the hemisphere. Reflecting the transnational turn, scholars have shifted the focus away from the Colossus of the North and investigated the dynamic interplay that occurs in, between, and among nations across Latin America and the Global South.[7] This approach has led to a reexamination of the very nature, significance, and contours of the power dynamic between the United States and nations across Latin America. These new perspectives have greatly enriched our understanding of the multiple factors, forces, actors, and powers that coalesce or conflict historically.

25 I wonder, however, if in addition to this historiographical turn, the decreased attention some scholars pay to the role of the United States in Latin America reflects current political realities and the relatively low level of U.S. involvement in the region. Scholars largely agree that our present inevitably shapes our vision of the past and, therefore, the questions we ask about it, the topics we choose to research, and, to some degree, the conclusions we draw. Could one result of the United States' massive involvement in the Middle East and the "war on terrorism" and its concomitant decreased engagement with Latin America during the last sixteen years affect how pivotal a role scholars consider the United States played in Latin American politics in the past? If this is the case, I think it is a mistake, for reasons I present below.

26 In light of these comments, I now turn to discuss how the chapters that do incorporate U.S. involvement in the regions analyze the importance and effect of the United States on the Right and Latin America. Mila Burns' chapter asks, but never really answers, whether Brazil and the United States worked as partners in the overthrow of Chile. The very question reveals a new and interesting perspective on U.S.-Brazilian relations and their respective responsibilities vis-à-vis the ouster of Allende. Working as partners suggests equality; centering Brazil as the key actor

highlights the central role that Brazil played in the overthrow of Allende and positions the United States as an important but secondary actor. Today, Brazil has emerged as the most powerful nation in Latin America. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the United States still held sway in the region. While Burns' chapter brings to light a critical aspect of the multiple forces that worked to overthrow the Allende government and thus develops a more accurate picture of what the Popular Unity government was up against, it is important to assert that the United States was the key non-Chilean actor that politically and materially sponsored the coup d'état on September 11, 1973.

27 Jonathan Brown's chapter also challenges the notion that Washington manipulated and dictated politics across Latin America, an attitude that strips local political actors of any agency or significance in their own nation's history. To do so, he investigates the level of U. S. participation in six out of ten coup d'états in Latin America during the 1960s and concludes that of the six, the United States supported only one, Brazil in 1964.[8] In other words, Latin Americans either overthrew their own leaders in opposition to the wishes of Washington or they acted independently of it. After examining these six military seizures of power Brown concludes, "In other words, U.S. diplomacy did not have the power either to instigate the savage repression or to bring about its cessation. Local agency prevailed, which remained the principal continuity from one decade to the next."

28 This conclusion, I believe, swings the pendulum too far in the wrong direction. On what basis did Brown choose these six coups and that time period to examine? The evidence he presents is new and convincing and makes a persuasive argument. But do the coups he discusses fully represent the sweep of U.S. government policies in Latin America? I think not. Would the government of President Arbenz of Guatemala have been overthrown without the machinations of the United Fruit Company, the Dulles brothers, the CIA, and the U.S. military? Undisputedly not! And didn't the United States scheme to get rid of Salvador Allende even before he assumed office in 1970? True, the United States worked closely with anti-Allende forces in Chile, and without the Chilean *golpistas* there would have been no coup, but to state that is very different from absolving the United States from all responsibility for the military dictatorships that swept to power throughout the Southern Cone beginning in Brazil in 1964 and continued in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Argentina in the 1970s. It prevents us from clearly understanding and sufficiently condemning the high degree of responsibility that the United States had in the violence and attacks on human rights that plagued the continent during those years. Nonetheless, Brown's point is well taken. In order to understand political dynamics and historical outcomes in Latin America, we cannot simply assume that the United States instigates and determines what happens. We need to examine the national context and actors as well to get a fuller, more complete picture.

29 Aaron Bell's perspective on U.S.-Latin American relationships differs from that of Brown's, as is clear in his discussion of the connections between the Salvadoran Right and the United States during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Because Carter's policy emphasized the importance of tying respect for human rights to U.S. aid and the Salvadoran military flagrantly tortured, murdered, and disappeared Salvadorans, the U.S. government distanced itself from the Salvadoran government. In response, the Salvadoran Right proceeded to bypass the U.S. government and seek the aid of right-wing forces in the United States. Bell's chapter shows the fluid nature of relations between the Salvadoran and U.S. Right. In an effort to prevent the reelection of Carter and to secure needed funds for its fight against the FMLN, the Salvadoran Right urged the U.S. Right to take more seriously the threat that

communism posed by emphasizing El Salvador's geostrategic importance between the Panama Canal and the oil fields of Mexico. In turn, McKenzie-McCheyne, a U.S. public relations firm, urged the Salvadoran Right to form ARENA in an effort to improve its public image. The interplay between these non-state actors offers a new and important dimension to the discussion of U.S.-Latin American relations.

30 In his chapter on anti-communism and opinion polls, Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta notes that during the Cold War, U.S. dollars and influence led to an increase in anti-communist images in the Brazilian media and among the public. Because the U.S. government wanted to know exactly what Brazilians thought and felt about communism, the United States Information Agency pumped money into Brazil to finance polls. At the same time, the U.S. government financed media campaigns to convince Brazilians that "the Red Menace" was a real and growing threat that they needed to take seriously and oppose. In this way, the United States directly contributed to preparing the ideological terrain that contributed to a majority of Brazilians calling for and welcoming the military's 1964 overthrow of João Goulart.

## Class

31 The United States was not the only topic that most of the chapters ignored; so, too was class. One sign of the extent to which Marxist intellectual categories no longer dominate studies of Latin American history is that only Verónica Valdivia includes a substantial discussion of class in relation to the Right in her chapter. This is a far cry from earlier scholars who by and large conflated the Right with the elite/wealthy/upper classes.

32 I recall the first time I presented my findings on how Chilean women voted during the Popular Unity government (1970-73) at the Latin American Studies Association annual conference in 1997 in Mexico. Because men and women vote separately in Chile, I was able to determine how women and men in diverse neighborhoods in Santiago voted in a number of different elections. Using the neighborhoods as a proxy for class, I concluded that working-class women, unlike working-class men, seldom, if ever cast the majority of their votes for Allende. In fact, in many cases the majority of working-class women voted for the opposition and not the Popular Unity candidates. Prior to my presentation of this data, most scholars, along with the general public, had assumed that the working class as a bloc had voted for the Popular Unity and that opposition had come overwhelmingly from the upper class or bourgeoisie and some sectors of the middle class.[9] So firmly embedded was the idea that the united working class had supported the Popular Unity and that only the elite, working hand in glove with the United States, had executed the government's overthrow, that my paper elicited quite a deal of disbelief and hostility. My work no longer generates similar responses, but I am nonetheless surprised to see that class figures so little in these books' discussion of the Rights.

33 Valdivia's discussion of the Union Democrática Independiente (UDI) explores the relevance of class to this party's foundation, formulation of politics, adoption of a neoliberal economic model, and decision to "penetrate the *poblaciones*," the large working-class and poor neighborhoods in Santiago. She traces the origins of UDI to *gremialismo* and the *gremialistas* to Chile's oligarchy, "the owners of the large *latifundios*, whose ancestors included a number of former presidents, members of Parliament, and ecclesiastical authorities." UDI emerged in 1983, during the Pinochet dictatorship, as the face of the "modern," neoliberal Right par excellence. To increase public acceptance of neoliberal economic policies, UDI worked to

stimulate popular support for privatization; elevate the role of the individual, which simultaneously undermined class-based bonds among the poor and working class. It established a *Departamento Poblacional* to promote its politics among the poor and working class and generate support for the *municipalización* of urban politics. In other words, Valdivia shows how class informed and intersected with the methods and politics of the new Right in Chile. She illustrates how UDI, a party of the neoliberal elite, took concrete steps to insert itself among the *pobladores* to engender adhesion to a capitalist model that favored the elite and, in the end, hurt the poor.

34 As numerous studies have shown, the Right cannot be understood or defined merely as an expression of elite class interest. People from all classes (as well as races, religions, ethnicities, nationalities, sexual orientations, and genders) identify with and define the Right and work to promote its ideology and program, however diverse their interpretations of what that means and however different expressions of the Right across time and geography may be. Yet, the absence of any substantial discussion of class in these chapters, with the exception of Valdivia's chapter, is striking. In order to comprehend the appeal and power of the Right, or the lack thereof, I suggest we need to resurrect or redeploy class as a significant tool of analysis. It is important to understand the class-based interests of the Right, how and why members of different classes affiliate with the Right, and how and to what extent class shapes how individuals, movements, and parties interpret and articulate what it means to be part of the Right.

## Violence

35 One of the themes that inevitably emerges in many discussions of the Right is the question of violence. As a political force that either holds or seeks to obtain power legally or illegally, or seek vengeance against those with whom it disagrees, violence is a significant weapon in the Right's arsenal. Even in those chapters that do not mention violence directly, violence is an omnipresent force in the political scenario in which the Right operates. For example, although Valdivia's chapter does not overtly allude to violence, it is nonetheless present. UDI's support of the Chilean military regime eloquently testifies to this. In both Rodríguez's and Bucheli's chapter, there can be no doubt that the different expressions of the Right they examine openly advocated the use of violence and, in some cases, practiced it.

36 A central focus of other chapters, such as Juan Luis Besoky's, is, indeed, violence. He focuses on the Argentine military state's use of violence from 1973 to 1975, most specifically through the Triple A, the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina. Besoky offers a detailed analysis of the institutional structure of the forces that employed violence and concludes that the AAA was neither a death squad nor an expression of para-state violence, since the Argentine state controlled it. The violence in Argentina was centralized in and monopolized by the state, directed against those the state classified as the enemy, and horribly ruthless in its implementation.

37 Maud Chirio traces the protracted history of the development of the concept of the internal enemy. Beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the French and U.S. military trainers instructed the Southern Cone armed forces that the so-called subversive citizens of their respective nations represented the true national danger and therefore should be the prime target of their surveillance and attack. Thus, when the militaries across the Southern Cone seized power in the 1960s and 1970s they were primed to unleash unprecedented levels of violence against their fellow citizens, who had become, in the eyes of the armed forces, the principal enemy

bent on destroying the nation, its institutions, and its values.

38 Jose Diaz Nieva's chapter examines the extreme right-wing *Avanzada Nacional*, and other extreme right-wing groups, which he calls "the right to the right of Pinochet." Now that's the Right! And can there be any doubt that extreme right-wing Chilean Nationalist parties, fervent backers of General Augusto Pinochet, advocated violence? *Avanzada Nacional* backed the *"Gesta Libertadora"* of September 11, 1973. The party elected as its president Álvaro Corbalán Castilla, a former army officer and high official in the DINA/CNI. One of the other parties, *Partido del Sur*, put forward Pablo Rodríguez, the former leader of the neofascist and extremely violent *Patria y Libertad* as its candidate for the presidency following the 1988 plebiscite in Chile.

39 Thomas Rath's examination of Mexican Bonifacio Salinas Leal treats much more than violence, yet he also makes it clear that violence was an essential component of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*'s (PRI) daily operations and ability to maintain power for seventy-some years. As Rath states, his study of Salinas Leal "tells us something useful about the Right in twentieth-century Mexico." Salinas was a politician, military officer, and high-ranking official of the PRI. As such, he drew on the resources at his disposal to reward those Mexicans who accepted the leadership, policies, and power of the PRI. He cultivated alliances with other power brokers in Mexican society, such as the business and financial interests that simultaneously benefitted from, threw their support behind, and relied for protection on the PRI. However, if you defied the PRI, protested its program, or challenged its economic partners, then the Governor "cracked down" on you. When the oil workers in Veracruz went on strike in 1946, General Salinas simply sent in the troops to break the strike. In short, this chapter shows that while the PRI was far too sophisticated to rely solely on the use of force, the threat of bloodshed was omnipresent and central to understanding how the PRI retained power for over seven decades.

40 Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta's examination of anti-communism and public opinion polls is not ostensibly about violence. It clearly shows how U.S. dollars and influence convinced a large percentage, in some cases a majority, of Brazilians that communism posed a real threat to Brazil. But what was the outcome of this growing fear of communism among Brazilians? One result was that an ever increasing number of Brazilians associated the presidency of João Goulart with communism and were increasingly predisposed to accept military intervention and the consequential removal of the communist danger. In other words, they either accepted or advocated the use of violence against the democratically-elected government of João Goulart. Further, surveys showed that a majority of Brazilians supported the armed forces' authoritarian assumption of power and the anti-democratic policies they subsequently employed against the "subversives." In short, violence, whether overtly and systematically deployed, as in the case of the military dictatorships of Chile and Argentina, or employed less frequently but, when needed, just as brutally, as in the example of Mexico, is intrinsic to the nature and politics of the Right across Latin America.

# Section Two

41 There are two significant areas that the chapters in this book did not address: gender and women. As a growing number of scholars have pointed out, gender is a critical lens through which to examine the Right.[10] It illuminates how the Right understands, defines, and projects the definition of femininity and masculinity,

men's and women's roles in politics, the home, society, and with each other. Gendered language and reasoning frequently served as cornerstones of the Latin American Rights' doctrine, programs, appeals, and successes (or failures). An exploration of the Right and gender deepens and enriches our ability to interpret what motivated the Right, just as it contributes to our understanding of how the Latin American Rights functioned and what their goals were. For example, in a recent article Valeria Manzano discusses how the Argentine military perceived and projected women guerrillas or women activists as threats to patriarchal concepts of gender and sexuality.[11] The armed forces' understanding of women intensified the military's barbarism toward female prisoners and, in part, explains the massive use of rape against them. This is but one example that demonstrates why it is important to know more how the Latin American Rights understood gender and the correct practice of it and to what extent and how these ideas shaped the Rights and influenced their politics.

42 In the last fifteen to twenty years, a number of publications have explored women's participation in the Latin American Rights.[12] Almost without exception, the chapters in this book have failed to acknowledge the presence of women in the Latin American Rights and the distinct difference their participation has made in and to the Rights. Instead, the default setting for the subjects of most of the chapters has either been men or non-gendered, which generally tends to mean men. Failing to address women as key political actors in the Latin American Rights not only means that the chapters overlooked the significant contributions that women made to and for the Rights, it also weakens scholars' ability to grasp the full range of and diverse levels on which the Rights operated. It is simply not possible to obtain a complete and accurate assessment of the Right unless women's roles within it are part of the analysis.

43 Despite my criticism that the book neglects the critical issues of gender and women, I hope that this Afterword has made very clear how important this book is and the significant contributions it makes to the study of the Right and of politics in general in Latin America. I reiterate my opening comments: the chapters that comprise this book are well-researched, address new or under-studied topics, and are very engaging. The book greatly increases our understanding and awareness of the panoply of rightist formations that existed across Latin America and establishes the importance of the Right to Latin American history and politics. I hope it encourages other scholars to further investigate the various expressions of the Latin American Rights.

44 July 29, 2015

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## *Notes*

1 In general I follow the title of the book and use the word Rights to describe the multiple expressions of the Right in Latin America. I use Right in the singular when I refer to a specific expression of the Right.

2 For an excellent historiographical discussion of the Right see McGee Deutsch, Sandra, *Las Derechas. The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999.

3 This is a subject that Tanya Harmer also examines in *Allende's Chile: The Inter-American Cold War*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

4 See McSherry, J. Patrice, *Predatory Sates: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America*, Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.

5 For examples of books that do examine Protestantism in Latin America see, Brusco, Elizabeth, *The Reformation of Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia*,

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6 Power, Margaret, "Transnational, Conservative, Catholic, and Anti-Communist: Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP)", in Martin Durham and Margaret Power (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 85-105.

7 See, for example, Joseph, Gilbert M. and LeGrand, Catherine, *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, Durham – London, Duke University Press, 1998 and Stites Mor, Jessica (ed.), *Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2013.

8 The six coups Brown discusses are the overthrow of Presidents Arturo Frondizi of Argentina in 1962; Manuel Prado of Peru in 1962; João Goulart of Brazil in 1964; Arturo Illia of Argentina in 1966; Fernando Belaúnde of Peru in 1968; and Arnulfo Arias of Panama in 1968.

9 See Power, Margaret, *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende, 1964-1973*, University Park, Penn State University Press, 2002.

10 See, for example, Blee, Kathleen M. and McGee Deutsch, Sandra (eds.), *Women of the Right: International and Transnational Perspectives*, University Park, Penn State University Press, 2012; Cowan, Benjamin, "Sex and the Security State: Gender, Sexuality, and 'Subversion' at Brazil's Escola Superior de Guerra, 1964-1985", *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 2008, vol. 16, no. 3, p. 459-481; McGee Deutsch, Sandra, *Las derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 1999; Gonzalez-Rivera, Victoria and Kampwirth, Karen (eds.), *Radical Women in Latin America. Left and Right*, University Park, Penn State University Press, 2001; Power, Margaret, *Right-Wing Women in Chile*.

11 Manzano, Valeria, "Sex, Gender, and the Making of the 'Enemy Within' in Cold War Argentina", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 2015, vol. 47, issue 1, p. 1-29.

12 In addition to the studies listed in footnote six, see Deus Simões, Solange de, *Deus, Pátria, e Família: As mulheres no golpe de 1964*, Petrópolis, Vozes, 1985; Gonzalez-Rivera, Victoria, *Before the Revolution. Women's Rights and Right-Wing Politics in Nicaragua, 1821-1979*, University Park, Penn State University Press, 2011; Power, Margaret, "Who but a Woman? The Transnational Diffusion of Anti-Communism among Conservative Women in Brazil, Chile and the United States during the Cold War", Journal of Latin American Studies, 2015, vol. 47, issue 01, p. 93-119; Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Verónica, "Were Women and Young People the Heart of the Pinochet Regime?: Rise and Decline of the Secretariats", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 2013, vol. 93, n° 4, p. 547-583.

## Table des illustrations

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| **Légende** | Mujeres golpeando las cacerolas. Santiago de Chile, 1971. Centro de Documentación de *El Mercurio*. Publicado en Power, Margaret, *La mujer de derecha. El poder femenino y la lucha contra Salvador Allende, 1964-1973*, DIBAM, Santiago, 2008, p. 173 |
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## *Droits d'auteur*

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